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Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 377 (2012). 
 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a doctrinal mess.1  Through a 
totality of circumstances inquiry, Section 2 has evolved from its modest 
beginnings as a codification of the Fifteenth Amendment into a “mys-
terious judicial inquiry”2 that places the Supreme Court in the envia-
ble position of policing the contours of the politics of race.  This is a 
role that the Justices have played to mixed reviews.  The criticisms are 
well known:  not only does the doctrine offer little guidance to the 
lower courts,3 but it also promotes the creation of majority-minority 
districts, a mode of racial policymaking that is said to be inconsistent 
with our commitment to racial equality.4  These two criticisms make 
clear that Section 2 is vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
 
†  Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Maurer School of Law, Indi-
ana University, Bloomington. 
1 See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2006)). 
2 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2:  Of Biased Votes, Unconstitu-
tional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 381 (2012). 
3 See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS—AND WRONGS:  THE ELUSIVE 
QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 206 (2009) (arguing that the Court will have 
to resolve questions of race and representation surrounding Section 2). 
4 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (rejecting a reapportionment plan be-
cause it gave the misleading “perception that members of the same racial group . . . think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls”). 
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Professor Elmendorf’s article is a welcome response to this state of 
affairs.  He offers an understanding of Section 2 “as a delegation of 
authority to the courts to develop a common law of racially fair elec-
tions, guided by certain substantive and evidentiary norms, as well as 
norms about legal change.”5  This is a thoughtful and intriguing pro-
posal.  It also finds much support from the historical record in at least 
three respects.  First, a call to delegate authority to the courts is precise-
ly the approach Congress took when it chose to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment through the Voting Rights Act.6  This argument need only 
recognize two obvious points:  that Congress wished to enforce the 
amendment to its constitutional limits, and that Congress could not be 
sure where these limits were.  What we see in response is a statute draft-
ed in general terms, which was essentially an invitation to the Court to 
extend the law as far as constitutionally permissible.7  The language also 
allowed the Justices to adapt the law to changing circumstances.8   
Second, conceptualizing Section 2 as a common law statute makes 
sense of the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence.  This is how the 
Court has interpreted the Voting Rights Act—and Section 2 in partic-
 
5 Elmendorf, supra note 2, at 383. 
6 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 729 (2009) (arguing that Congress wanted to “shift the 
constitutional inquiry . . . to the Attorney General or the district court” to speed up 
changes in the law and shift the burden of proof to the states). 
7 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969) (“Indicative of an 
intention to give the Act the broadest possible scope, Congress expanded the language 
in the final version of § 2 . . . .”); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder 
(NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2514 (2009) (explaining that “specific precedent, the 
structure of the Voting Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns compel a 
broader reading of the bailout provision” under Section 4(a) of the Act); 
NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2524 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[B]ecause it sweeps more broadly than the substantive command of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, § 5 pushes the outer boundaries of Congress’ Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority.”).  
8 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (reinterpreting § 5’s retrogres-
sion inquiry as a totality of circumstances test); Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 
439 U.S. 32, 47 (1978) (applying § 5 to a county school board’s internal policy regard-
ing employees running for public office); United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 
110, 117-18 (1978) (applying § 5 to all political units, not just those listed in 
§ 14(c)(2)); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973) (applying § 5 to ap-
portionment); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-95 (1971) (applying § 5 to 
changes in polling places and boundary lines, as well as to the shift from ward-based 
voting to at-large elections). 
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ular—for much of its history.9  Finally, the substantive norms at the 
heart of Elmendorf’s proposal date back to arguments made in the 
early years of the Act.  Under his proposal, a dilution injury is one 
where “race-biased decisionmaking . . . results in minorities having less 
representational opportunity than they otherwise would.”10  A “race-
biased decision” is a decision that “would have been different had the 
race of persons considered by the decisionmaker been different.”11  A 
participation injury arises when race-biased decisions lead to “dispar-
ate burdens on minority participation.”12  Similar arguments were 
pressed by former Attorney General Katzenbach during the 1975 Sen-
ate hearings and by lower courts in the early years of the Act.13 
That said, I part company with Professor Elmendorf, if modestly so, 
in one crucial respect.  His proposal requires much greater faith in 
the conservative Justices on the Court than the existing evidence al-
lows me to endorse.  As an attitudinal question, these Justices have 
made clear that they are not fans of race-conscious policymaking in 
general and of Section 2 in particular.  Chief Justice Roberts, for ex-
ample, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito, writes that the creation of 
majority-minority districts is a “sordid business, this divvying us up by 
race.”14  Justice Thomas argues that these districts “exacerbate racial 
tensions,”15 and explains, more generally, that “[w]e would be mighty 
Platonic guardians indeed if Congress had granted us the authority to 
determine the best form of local government for every county, city, 
village, and town in America.”16  Justice Scalia agrees that the jurispru-
dence in this area “continues to drift ever further from the Act’s pur-
 
9 For a general discussion of the Court’s interpretation of Section 2, see Guy-Uriel E. 
Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The VRA in Winter:  The Death of a Superstatute (2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author). 
10 Elmendorf, supra note 2, at 383-84. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 See Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965:  Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S. 
1409, and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong. 125 (1975) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, former Att’y Gen. of 
the United States) (“While blacks have made important gains, these gains do not reflect 
the political power of their numbers were there no discrimination.”); see also Beer v. 
United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 389-90 (D.D.C. 1974) (explaining that “the question 
before us is not whether New Orleans must confer upon its black citizens every political 
advantage that a redistricting plan conceivably could offer,” and suggesting that plaintiffs 
should “press vigorously . . . for all that is their due, but . . . no more”). 
14 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
15 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
16 Id. at 913. 
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pose of ensuring minority voters equal electoral opportunities.”17  
These four Justices are poised to strike down the Act on constitutional 
grounds.18 
Professor Elmendorf recognizes this problem.  He responds that 
his proposed standard “should allay the concerns of critics like Justice 
Thomas, who assert that insofar as Section 2 reaches anything beyond 
barriers to casting a valid, duly counted ballot, nothing will limit it ex-
cept the ‘political imagination’ of judges.”19  Elmendorf reads this pas-
sage to suggest that Justice Thomas objects to Section 2 because of its 
lack of limits on judges.   
I read these Justices differently.  They seem to be concerned not 
with the lack of a limiting principle for Section 2, but with the fact that 
Section 2 is too race-conscious for their taste.  Their particular concern 
is a matter of policy and not necessarily legal interpretation.  Through 
their interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, Justices Scalia and Thom-
as have made clear that they will go to any lengths in order to see their 
policy preferences reflected in law, irrespective of the will of Congress 
or established precedent.  As I argue elsewhere, their interpretations of 
the Act can only be described as “judicial activism on steroids.”20 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Reno v. Bossier Parish School 
Board (Bossier Parish II) encapsulates his interpretive approach.21  This 
is a case where Justice Scalia showcases his considerable abilities as 
both jurist and sophist.22  Conclusion in hand, he easily casts aside 
contrary precedents as “nothing more than an ex necessitate limitation 
upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation,”23 or by 
explaining that the case “involved an unusual fact pattern,”24 or by not-
 
17 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
18 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands 
of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 127 (2010) (“Five Jus-
tices have strong reservations about the constitutionality . . . of [S]ection 2 . . . . 
Whether the Court ultimately strikes down [Section 2] is a question only Justice 
Kennedy can answer.”). 
19 Elmendorf, supra note 2, at 383 n.26 (quoting Holder, 512 U.S. at 911 
(Thomas, J., concurring)). 
20 Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 751. 
21 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
22 See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 739 (describing the opinion as a “lawyerly 
brief, full of technical arguments and distinguished cases”). 
23 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 330 (referring to City of Richmond v. United 
States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975)). 
24 Id. at 339 (referring to City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987)). 
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ing that unsupportive language was “pure dictum.”25  Needless to say, 
the intent of Congress plays no part in the Court’s decision.  Curious-
ly, however, neither does the language of the statute.  This is an atti-
tudinal tour de force.26  The opinion brings to mind criticism penned 
by Justice Scalia himself about judging and the “Living Constitution”:   
The starting point of the analysis will be Supreme Court cases, and the 
new issue will presumptively be decided according to the logic that those 
cases expressed, with no regard for how far that logic, thus extended, has 
distanced us from the original text and understanding.  Worse still, how-
ever, it is known and understood that if that logic fails to produce what in 
the view of the current Supreme Court is the desirable result for the case 
at hand, then, like good common-law judges, the Court will distinguish its 
precedents, or narrow them, or if all else fails overrule them, in order that 
the Constitution might mean what it ought to mean.27 
This passage accurately describes the Court’s opinion in Bossier Parish II.  
Justice Thomas is similarly creative.  In his concurring opinion in 
Holder v. Hall, he challenges the existing orthodoxy, which places the 
Supreme Court in charge of questions of political representation.28  As 
an abstract question of political theory, Justice Thomas makes a pow-
erful point; redistricting questions in general and the concept of 
vote dilution in particular ask courts “‘to choose among competing 
bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing theo-
ries of political philosophy.’”29  As a question of law, however, his 
opinion is terribly unpersuasive. 
To begin, Justice Thomas’s opinion candidly admits to the role played 
by his personal politics and policy preferences.  The Justice can hardly 
conceal his contempt for the use of race by the state.  As he argues,  
in resolving vote dilution actions we have given credence to the view that 
race defines political interest.  We have acted on the implicit assumption 
that members of racial and ethnic groups must all think alike on im-
portant matters of public policy and must have their own “minority pre-
 
25 Id. at 338 (referring to a statement regarding apportionment from Beer v. Unit-
ed States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)). 
26 For a description of the attitudinal model, which argues that “the Supreme Court 
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and 
values of the justices,” see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002). 
27 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
28 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
29 Id. at 897 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting)); see also id. at 894 (“Vote dilution cases have required the federal courts to 
make decisions based on highly political judgments—judgments that courts are inher-
ently ill-equipped to make.”). 
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ferred” representatives holding seats in elected bodies if they are to be con-
sidered represented at all.
30
   
Consequently, he writes that “few devices could be better de-
signed to exacerbate racial tensions than the consciously segregated 
districting system currently being constructed in the name of the 
Voting Rights Act.”31   
For evidence that his attitudes about race are driving the analysis, 
note that his argument about political theory as applied to the Voting 
Rights Act applies with equal if not stronger force to the law of de-
mocracy writ large.  If the argument is one of political theory and the 
immersion of federal courts into an area where contested and irre-
solvable political questions abound, then his work is only beginning.  
He must be prepared to overturn fifty years of election law while re-
turning the Court to the days before Baker v. Carr.  But twenty years 
after Holder, he has yet to take up this cause. 
Only after demonstrating his displeasure with the use of race in 
this context does Justice Thomas turn to law, and specifically to the 
plain meaning of the statute.  He offers a reading of Section 2’s lan-
guage that returns the jurisprudence to the early days of the Act, up to 
1969.  From his perspective, the post-1969 jurisprudence is where eve-
rything went wrong, starting with Allen v. State Board of Elections.32  As 
his many citations to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Allen attest, this is not 
a new fight.33  It is also true that much precedent stands in his way.  
This is precedent that, incidentally, has been ratified by Congress nu-
merous times.  Yet these earlier cases, not to mention the historical 
record, prove no match to Justice Thomas’s ingenuity, just like Justice 
Scalia’s in Bossier Parish II.  In this case, as in many others, he is clearly 
and unquestionably a “single-minded seeker[] of legal policy.”34 
The question for the future is whether Justices Scalia and Thomas 
will eventually move the Court’s conservative wing toward their pre-
ferred position.  This is particularly pertinent as applied to Justice 
 
30 Id. at 903. 
31 Id. at 907; see also id. at 905 (“We have involved the federal courts, and indeed the 
Nation, in the enterprise of systematically dividing the country into electoral districts 
along racial lines—an enterprise of segregating the races into political homelands that 
amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of ‘political apartheid.’” (quoting Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1994))). 
32 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
33 See Holder, 512 U.S. at 896, 898-99, 919-20, 922, 930, 935. 
34 Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 
86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992). 
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Thomas, who in recent years has seen his influence on the Court 
grow to the point that many of his positions that were once consid-
ered radical now command a majority of Justices.35  If Justice Thomas 
had his way, then the Voting Rights Act—a superstatute in its own 
right 36 —will be domesticated and rendered an ordinary statute 
through judicial interpretation or, more extremely, will be struck 
down on constitutional grounds.   
But on this question, as with many others, the final word rests with 
Justice Kennedy, the Court’s resident super median.37  Almost twenty 
years ago, Justice Kennedy argued that racial districts hinge on “offen-
sive and demeaning assumption[s]” about minority voters and lead to 
racial stereotyping.38  This was the essentialist critique that was a staple 
of conservative jurisprudence in the 1990s.  It fit comfortably with the 
general colorblind critique of race-conscious measures.  Justice Ken-
nedy expressed these views as late as 2003, in his dissent in Grutter v. 
Bollinger.39  Four years later, however, Justice Kennedy’s views began to 
shift.40  The case was League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 
(LULAC).41  This change reflected a far more accommodating view on 
questions of race than Justice Kennedy had expressed throughout his 
 
35 See Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 41 (“Since the arri-
val of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., in 2005, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., in 
2006, the Court has moved to the right when it comes to the free-speech rights of 
corporations, the rights of gun owners, and, potentially, the powers of the federal 
government; in each of these areas, the majority has followed where Thomas has 
been leading for a decade or more.  Rarely has a Supreme Court Justice enjoyed 
such broad or significant vindication.”). 
36 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 76 (2010) (describing how the civil rights movement led 
to an “electoral transformation . . . through federal superstatutes”); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & 
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Superstatutory Interpretation (2012) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (arguing that the VRA is a superstatute and has been understood 
and interpreted by the Supreme Court as such throughout its history).   
37 See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 43 (2008) 
(describing Justice Kennedy as a super median Justice due to his ability to “extract 
considerable deference and exert inordinate influence on the Court”). 
38 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995). 
39 See 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If universities are given 
the latitude to administer programs that are tantamount to quotas, they will have few 
incentives to make the existing minority admissions schemes transparent and protec-
tive of individual review.  The unhappy consequence will be to perpetuate the hostili-
ties that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid.  The perpetuation, of 
course, would be the worst of all outcomes.”). 
40 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Is this the End of the Second Reconstruction? 13 (Ind. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 197, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954684. 
41 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
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career on the bench.42  Two years later, in his controlling concurring 
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 (Parents Involved),43 Justice Kennedy spelled out his changing 
views.  He no longer subscribed to “an all-too-unyielding insistence 
that race cannot be a factor,” nor did he agree with the plurality’s 
“dismissive[ness] of the legitimate interest government has in ensur-
ing all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”44  Jus-
tice Kennedy even took on Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
an iconic statement of faith in conservative circles.45  According to 
Kennedy, Harlan’s axiom that “[o]ur constitution is color-blind”46 is 
nothing more than an “aspiration,” and as such, it “must command 
our assent.”47  This is where most arguments end, but not Justice Ken-
nedy’s.  For as he explained, “In the real world, it is regrettable to say, 
it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”48  The shift in Ken-
nedy’s jurisprudence is nothing short of “striking.”49 
This shift is the reason why this Response ends on a hopeful note.  
Professor Elemndorf’s approach seems tailor-made for Justice Kenne-
dy.  Though I am skeptical that Justices Scalia and Thomas would 
grapple seriously with the content of a common law approach to poli-
cymaking in the context of voting rights, Justice Kennedy has shown 
that he is willing to engage.  It is less than clear that the Court’s con-
servative wing is interested in giving these questions the care they de-
serve.  Rather, slogans and ideology tend to replace thoughtful en-
engagement with these difficult issues.50   
Without a doubt, the questions raised by the Voting Rights Act 
are serious questions of policy and constitutional law.  They demand 
serious answers.  Professor Elmendorf’s rich and thoughtful argu-
ment has provided an important framework that promises to move 
us forward.  But this is why the efficacy, and ultimately the constitu-
 
42 Id. at 435 (rejecting a state redistricting plan because it divided a particular Lati-
no district as a result of the district having “found an efficacious political identity”). 
43 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
44 Id. at 787-88. 
45 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
46 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
47 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788. 
48 Id. 
49 Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 104, 109 (2007). 
50 How else to understand the Chief Justice’s statement that the “way to stop dis-
crimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race?”  Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
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tionality, of the Voting Rights Act, hangs in the balance.  The ball is 
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